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Informality, measured as the share of the employed who do not have access to
social security, is high in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. This paper uses new
data from the 2010 Lebanon and Syria matched employer-employee surveys, which
include modules that directly test for ability (Raven’s progressive matrices) and self-
reported personality characteristics in addition to a detailed section on job quality.
The analysis of differentials in earning, self-reported attitudes toward jobs, working
conditions, and self-rated satisfaction across formal and informal jobs shows that,
even after controlling for measured ability and personality traits, there is a significant
formality premium. Moreover, in Lebanon, informal workers are significantly more
likely than formal workers to want to change jobs. These findings suggest that much
of the observed informality in these two countries might not be due to individual
choice but more likely to exclusion from formal markets.
JEL codes: H53, H55, J23, J24, J31, J32, J42, J71, J81, K31, M51, O531. Introduction
Informality is best understood as a multifaceted phenomenon, influenced by the rela-
tionship that the state establishes with private agents through regulation, monitoring,
and the provision of public services (see, for example, the discussion in Gatti et al.
2012). Countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are among the most
informal economies in the world, producing an average of about one-third of their
gross domestic products (GDP) and employing an average of about 67 percent of their
labor forces informally (measured using the Schneider index1 and the share of the
labor force without social security coverage, respectively) (Loayza and Wada 2010).
Social insurance systems in these countries are based historically on the Bismarckian
welfare state model, whereby pension, health, and disability benefits are linked to
employment in the formal sector. In most countries, in return for their contributions,
formal workers are entitled to generous benefit packages (Robalino 2005). Those
outside the formal sector, in both urban and rural areas, traditionally have had limited
or no access to formal risk management instruments or other government benefits.
The existing literature on informality traces its causes to different factors. In his
seminal work, De Soto (1989) characterizes informality as the result of exclusion from
formal markets. Instead, Perry et al. (2007) present evidence that informality in Latin
American countries results mostly from the choices of individuals who rationally opt
out of often inefficient and cumbersome formal markets. Other studies in Latin AmericanAlloush et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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its flexibility and potentially higher earnings (Paulson and Townsend 2005; Fields 2005;
Gunther and Launov 2011). Evidence on the Middle East and North Africa is more scant
(see Gatti et al. 2012). However, with more than two-thirds of workers in some countries
in the region without access to health or old-age insurance, understanding the determi-
nants of informal employment is an important objective in the labor literature as well as
for policy making in the region (Arias and Khamis 2008).
Defining and measuring informality are not a simple tasks. De Soto (1989) broadly
defines informality as the collective realm of firms, workers, and activities that operate
outside of the regulatory framework. Informality can be studied through three main
lenses: a firm-based perspective, an employment perspective (at the individual level),
and a fiscal perspective (untaxed activities) (Gatti et al. 2012; Gasparini and Tornarolli
2009). In this paper, we focus on informality at the individual level whereby those em-
ployees who are not registered through their firms in the national social insurance
schemes (the National Social Security Fund in Lebanon and the General Establishment
for Social Insurance in Syria) are considered informal (as in Maloney 2004; Perry et al.
2007; Angel-Urdinola et al. 2009). According to this definition, employees of registered
firms may well be informal if the firms do not register them in the national govern-
ment’s social insurance scheme.
Estimating the formality premium presents some challenges. Even after controlling
for education and experience, the wage differences between formal and informal work
can reflect significant, usually unobserved, factors: compensating differentials for those
who prefer flexible hours and schedule, fewer working hours, the value of training, and
the actual value of social security benefits given (for example, the quality of the services
to which the benefits give access) (see, for example, Maloney 1999, 2004; Marcoullier
et al. 1997). At the same time, selection into formal or informal jobs might be driven
by unobservable skills and ability, which in turn might also affect earnings. Thus, for
individuals with low (unobserved) skills who fall into informal employment and earn
little because of their limited ability, their lower wages relative to those of formal
workers might be erroneously attributed to informality rather than low productivity. In
spite of the central role played by informal labor in developing countries, little research
has been conducted on the estimation of the formality premium controlling for these
variables. This is often due to data limitations, since household surveys and labor force
surveys do not collect information on skills beyond educational achievement and years
of work experience.
This paper explores the determinants of informality and the informal-formal wage
gap in Lebanon and Syria. Given its focus on workers’ vulnerability, the paper defines
informal workers as those who are not registered in the national social security scheme.
Using this definition, it characterizes differences in labor market outcomes between
formal and informal workers along a rich set of individual and firm characteristics
(including age, education, firm size, location, and sector). More importantly, it brings a
new dimension to the existing literature by explicitly accounting for direct measures of
cognitive ability and socioemotional personality traits, which are usually not observed.
It does so using matched employer-employee data collected by the World Bank in
Lebanon and Syria that include individual results from nonverbal cognitive tests
(measuring workers’ logical and analytical skills) as well as self-assessed personality
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with the probability of being informal and that the wage gap between formal and
informal workers persists even once these proxies for ability are accounted for.
The paper also exploits a wealth of information on quality of employment and self-
reported workers’ preferences to inform the debate on whether informality in the
Middle East and North Africa results from exclusion or from choice to opt out of social
security coverage. To this end, the paper explores other differences across formal and
informal jobs, such as job duration, benefits, and job satisfaction. In contrast with
evidence for Mexico and other Latin American countries, this paper finds that informal
jobs in Lebanon and Syria are associated with worse benefits and lower satisfaction
than comparable formal jobs2. Finally, the paper discusses some conclusions and policy
recommendations from the analysis.
2. Labor markets in Lebanon and Syria
In Lebanon, the overall labor force participation in 2010 was 46 percent, up from 44
percent in 2004. Female labor force participation was low by international standards, at
20 percent, but has been steadily increasing over time. Relative to countries with similar
income levels, the Lebanese labor force is well educated, with over a third of individuals
having completed tertiary education (Robalino et al. 2012). The country registers high
levels of skilled-labor out-migration and a relatively large inflow of low-skilled workers
from other Arab countries (Kasparian 2009; Robalino et al. 2012).
In 2010, unemployment was relatively high in Lebanon (around 11 percent). Overall
in the country, unemployment rates decreased with age but increased with educational
attainment. However, unemployment duration was significantly higher for individuals
with lower education. Moreover, 40 percent of those employed in the private sector
were not registered in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and thus, by this
paper’s definition, were informal3. Patterns of informality vary considerable by age,
being higher among the youth (particularly among those 15–24 years old) and decreasing
rapidly when individuals reach 40–45 years of age (Gatti et al. 2012). It is estimated that
36 percent of the labor force is self-employed (Robalino et al. 2012)4.
In 2009 the Syrian labor market faced many challenges. First, the labor force partici-
pation rate was relatively low by international standards (52 percent), which was mainly
associated with the low participation of women in the labor force (14 percent). Further-
more, the unemployment rate was 8.4 percent and was heavily concentrated among
first-time job seekers, with youth unemployment reaching 20 percent in 20095. More-
over, 72 percent of the labor force was not covered by the national social insurance
scheme and, according to the definition used in our analysis, are considered informal6.
3. The data
The datasets used in this paper are from the World Bank’s 2010 matched employer-
employee surveys for Lebanon and Syria. The 2010 Syria employer-employee dataset
contains information on 961 private sector workers employed in 116 firms in the
manufacturing and services sectors. The 2010 Lebanon employer-employee survey
surveyed a total of 1,841 labor force participants7 of which 764 were employees in the
private sector. These surveys were implemented in two different ways. In Syria, the
World Bank Enterprise Survey8, nationally representative of the private sector in
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the firm survey by interviewing a random sample of workers in these firms. In Lebanon,
the World Bank selected a nationally representative sample of households whose working
members responded to an extensive labor force module. Information was collected from
workers on each firm (including contact information, size, location, and industry). Based
on this information, a nationally representative sample of firms was then selected for
interviews to collect additional firm-level information. The distinct features of the two
surveys enable a deeper and complementary understanding of informality.
These datasets include not only basic data on the socioeconomic characteristics of
workers but also data on wages (starting and current levels, including bonuses), job
benefits, working conditions, and variables indicating the individuals’ overall job
satisfaction, which allow us to compare formal and informal workers across these
dimensions. Moreover, they contain information on workers’ skills assessment,
including cognitive and noncognitive tests that we used to proxy individual ability and
personality traits, allowing the analysis to compute the formality premium controlling
for such traits.
Finally, the two surveys provide data on whether each individual is registered in social
security, which were used to define informality in this paper. A worker is classified as
informal if he or she is an employee and works without being registered in the national
social insurance scheme. Public employees were not considered in the analysis because
they are not included in the sample in either country. Hence all comparisons between
countries refer to private sector employees only. For Lebanon, a separate sample of
self-employed was available, which we used to compare self-employed individuals with
formal and informal employees. For Syria, this comparison was not possible because
data on the self-employed were not available.
4. Ability, personality traits, and informality
Traditionally, studies have focused on measuring skills through educational attainment
and experience, without measuring ability directly. Ability might affect labor market
outcomes, including earnings. The ability bias has been discussed in the literature, and
Griliches (1977) provides one of the earliest attempts to correct for unmeasured ability
in the context of estimating returns to schooling. Although ability is not observable,
cognitive and noncognitive tests can be good proxies. An individual’s skill set can be
defined as a combination of cognitive, socioemotional, and technical skills. In turn,
given that human capital is multidimensional, both cognitive and socioemotional skills
can serve as good predictors of economic outcomes such as income and wealth (Bowles
et al. 2001; Hansen et al. 2004; Heckman et al. 2006; Green and Riddell 2003).
To measure cognitive skills of the labor force, the Lebanon and Syria surveys use the
“Raven’s Progressive Matrices,” a nonverbal, multiple-choice test in which individuals
have to identify the logical missing piece of a particular pattern of matrices. In these
tests, respondents have five minutes to answer as many of the 12 questions as they can.
The patterns in the questions become progressively more difficult, requiring greater
cognitive capacity. This test is independent of language, reading, or writing skills; it
focuses on measuring observation skills, analytical ability, and intellectual capacity
(Raven 1989; Jensen 1998). A score (in increments of 1 out of 12) is calculated for each
respondent based on the number of correct answers completed in the allocated time.
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reported in Table 1. They indicate that formal employees in Lebanon, on average, score
higher than informal employees and that this difference decreases as educational level
increases. In contrast, the reverse is true in Syria, where informal workers have higher
average cognitive scores and the observed difference increases with education. Both
countries show decreasing scores with age.
The noncognitive assessments consist of a list of statements describing personal
behaviors and characteristics corresponding to the five core dimensions of personality
used in the psychology literature to classify human personality (referred to as the
“Big Five”):
 Conscientiousness: tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking
 Emotional stability: tendency to be predictable and consistent in emotional
reactions
 Agreeableness: tendency to act in a cooperative and unselfish manner
 Extraversion: tendency to orient one’s energies toward the outer world of people
and things
 Openness to experience: tendency to be open to new cultural or intellectual
experiences
These traits have been shown to be relevant across cultures and considered to be
relatively stable throughout one’s lifetime (John and Srivastava 1999). Studies have also
shown that personality characteristics and socioemotional skills are important predic-
tors of economic outcomes in an individual’s lifetime (Borghans et al. 2008; Paunonen
2003; Heckman and Rubinstein 2001). The noncognitive test used in the Syria and
Lebanon surveys—an adaption of the Goldberg test (Goldberg 1993)—asks respondentsTable 1 Cognitive score means of formal and informal workers by education, gender,
and age group
Lebanon Syria
Average Formal Informal Average Formal Informal
Overall 5.13 5.54 4.85 4.56 4.44 4.86
Education level
No formal ed 3.37 3.53 3.22 2.57 2.48 2.68
Primary 3.97 4.17 3.79 3.80 3.75 3.92
Secondary 5.13 5.26 4.89 4.62 4.46 5.05
Tertiary 6.09 6.12 6.10 5.76 5.50 6.50
Gender
Male 5.17 5.41 4.76 4.58 4.49 4.83
Female 5.06 5.34 4.64 4.48 4.22 4.93
Age group
15–24 5.24 5.82 4.76 4.48 4.41 4.55
25–34 5.71 5.78 5.56 4.84 4.68 5.24
35–44 4.87 5.15 4.32 4.41 4.35 4.64
45–54 4.94 5.08 4.65 4.24 4.20 4.52
54+ 2.81 3.45 1.80 4.05 3.68 5.41
Note: Cognitive test scores are based on the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven 1989).
Alloush et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 6 of 182013, 2:18
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/18to rank on a scale of 1 to 7 the applicability of 15 traits or behaviors, each of which
correspond to one of the “Big Five.” With this information, a score for each of the “Big
Five” traits is calculated. In our regression analysis, we capture noncognitive skills with
a dummy taking the value of one if an individual is above the average self-rated score
for a particular trait9.
5. Empirical strategy and results
5.1 Determinants of informality
We first estimate the determinants of informality in Lebanon and Syria. Table 2 depicts
the probit regression outcomes for probability of being informal. In Lebanon, the
coefficients on education and age are negative and significant. Older or more educated
individuals are less likely to be informal. Firm size is significant in predicting informal-
ity, whereby working at a smaller firm significantly increases the chances of being
informal. Among personal traits, openness to experience is positive and significant
when it comes to predicting informality, whereas extraversion is significant yet makes
an individual less likely to be employed informally. However, the results show that
cognitive ability plays no significant role in the equation. Results are fairly similar for
the Syria sample10. As in Lebanon, cognitive ability is not a significant predictor of
informality in Syria. Moreover, an individual is more likely to informal if he or she is
employed at a small firm. Age is also significant as younger individuals are more likely
to be employed in informal jobs.
5.2 Formality premium
This section estimates the earnings gap between formal and informal employment,
taking different variables into account, including ability and personal characteristics.
Ceteris paribus, one assumes that, when given the choice, a person would prefer the
job with higher earnings. Considering income as a proxy for individual utility and
embedded in the principle of revealed preferences (Nguyen et al. 2013), an individual
would not choose to be employed informally if the overall earnings are significantly
lower in the informal sector. In other words, for salaried workers, a significant earnings
gap between a formal and an informal job would lead them to prefer the formal
job unless more benefits or better working conditions were associated with the
informal job.
When considering unconditional earnings, formal workers have higher average hourly
earnings than informal workers (see Table 3). In Lebanon, informal workers earn 36
percent less per hour than their formal counterparts. An earnings gap exists across
nearly all educational, gender, and age groups. In addition, an earnings gap is observed
across different industries11 and firm sizes as well as regions of the country. In Syria,
informal employees earn 19 percent less per hour than their formal counterparts, and
an earnings gap exists across nearly all educational, ability, and age groups as well as
sectors, firm sizes, and regions12.
We use kernel density plots of hourly wages for the formal and informal sectors to
further illustrate this result (see Figure 1). These density plots show that the estimated
probability density function (pdf ) of wages in the formal sector is to the right of the
pdf of wages in the informal sector, suggesting the existence of a formality premium
throughout the wage distribution.
Table 2 Determinants of informality regressions (probit regressions, marginal effects
reported)
Lebanon Syria
Dependent variable informal (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.0123 −0.0162 0.0573 0.0489
(0.0584) (0.0610) (0.0584) (0.0609)
Years of education −0.0172*** −0.0201*** −0.00542 −0.00527
(0.0054) (0.0060) (0.00440) (0.00490)
Age −0.0545*** −0.0614*** −0.0565*** −0.0562***
(0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Age2 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.000640*** 0.000634***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.000160) (0.000163)
Firm size <5 (base 10–49) 0.5321*** 0.5303*** 0.297*** 0.308***
(0.0614) (0.0653) (0.0827) (0.0803)
Firm size 5-9 0.2089** 0.2108** 0.268*** 0.279***
(0.0832) (0.0853) (0.0860) (0.0883)
Firm size >50 −0.1921*** −0.2358*** −0.285*** −0.273***
(0.0576) (0.0583) (0.0730) (0.0746)
Cognitive score quintile 2 0.1063 0.0408
(0.0823) (0.0521)
Cognitive score quintile 3 0.0667 0.00539
(0.0864) (0.0515)
Cognitive score quintile 4 0.0051 0.0116
(0.0863) (0.0743)
Cognitive score quintile 5 0.1107 0.0258
(0.0939) (0.0879)








Emotionally stable −0.0558 −0.0322
(0.0561) (0.0464)
Observations 502 490 928 928
Pseudo-R2 0.299 0.326 0.173 0.173
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions include industry and region
dummies. Regions in Lebanon were Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Bekaa, South Lebanon, and Nabatieh.
Regions in Syria were Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Latakia. In Lebanon, the industries include agriculture,
construction, education, wholesale, transport, finance, information and communications, and health. In Syria, the
industries include services and manufacturing.
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Mincerian-type regressions13. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage, taking
yearly bonuses into account and dividing by the estimated number of hours worked.
Results from the baseline regression (which includes as explanatory variables gender,
Table 3 Average hourly wages in Lebanon and Syria for salaried workers (USD)
Lebanon Syria
Overall Formal Informal % Difference Overall Formal Informal % Difference
Total 3.98 4.67 3 −35.80% 2.12 2.23 1.81 −19.10%
Educational
attainment
No formal education 2.64 2.93 1.89 −35.50% 1.32 1.41 1.17 −17.00%
Primary 3.68 3.95 2.48 −37.20% 1.69 1.82 1.34 −26.50%
Secondary 3.95 3.87 2.92 −24.30% 1.88 1.95 1.69 −13.40%




3.53 3.78 3.09 −18.20% 1.75 1.86 1.37 −26.30%
Cognitive score
quintile 2
3.71 4.27 2.61 −38.90% 1.73 1.78 1.6 −9.90%
Cognitive score
quintile 3
4.02 4.66 2.79 −40.20% 2.05 2.07 1.98 −4.50%
Cognitive score
quintile 4
4.79 5.55 2.86 −48.40% 2.53 2.72 1.92 −29.40%
Cognitive score
quintile 5
4.64 5.34 3.41 −36.10% 2.67 3.14 2.02 −35.50%
Gender
Male 4.08 4.67 3.16 −32.50% 2.2 2.3 1.91 −17.10%
Female 3.74 4.68 2.67 −42.80% 1.77 1.91 1.52 −20.20%
Age group
15–24 3.39 4.16 2.72 −34.60% 1.54 1.58 1.5 −4.90%
25–34 4.11 4.67 3.21 −31.20% 1.94 2.02 1.73 −14.30%
35–44 4.22 5.28 2.54 −51.90% 2.32 2.41 1.96 −18.50%
45–54 4.07 4.49 2.21 −50.80% 3 3.04 2.72 −10.50%
54+ 3.89 4.03 5.29 31.40% 2.47 2.46 2.49 1.00%
Firm size
<5 2.44 4.07 2.14 −47.40% 2.18 3.12 1.84 −41.20%
5–9 3.87 4.76 2.95 −38.10% 1.81 1.9 1.77 −7.00%
10–49 4.53 4.74 3.89 −18.00% 2.13 2.27 1.97 −13.40%
50+ 4.64 4.73 4.36 −7.80% 2.13 2.23 1.7 −23.40%
Economic sector
Agriculture 3.13 4.43 2.58 −41.70% n.a n.a n.a n.a
Manufacturing 3.88 4.26 2.4 −43.60% 2.07 2.16 1.82 −18.93%
Services 4.09 4.78 3.13 −34.50% 2.3 2.54 1.77 −43.07%
Note: Exchange rates considered were 1USD = 1,507 LL (Lebanon) and 1USD = 48.2 SL (Syria).
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holds a formal job) are depicted in regressions (1) and (3) in Table 4 for Lebanon and
Syria, respectively. These regressions also control for firm size, region, and industry.
Regressions (2) and (4) add cognitive test score quintiles and the personality trait
dummy variables.
The estimated formality premium in the baseline regression is 23 percent and 12
percent for Lebanon and Syria, respectively. It is important to control for firm charac-
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Log Hourly Wage (Syria 2010)
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Informal
Figure 1 Kernel density plots of hourly wages by employment sector.
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for productivity, which in turn could determine the wages that individuals receive.
Omitting this variable from an analysis of wage differentials could lead one to spuri-
ously attribute the formality premium to informal employment when it might instead
reflect firm characteristics. However, the results in Table 4 show that the earnings gap
between formal and informal workers persists even when firm size, region, and industry
are taken into account14.
Because assignment to the informal sector is not random, it is important to control
in some way for individual ability or skills to ensure that the attribution of the formality
premium does not instead reflect other usually unobservable factors. To overcome this
limitation in the interpretation of the estimation, the results of direct cognitive and
noncognitive tests are included in the regressions. When these are explicitly accounted
for, the formality premium is virtually unchanged: formal employment is associated
with a 22 percent premium in Lebanon and a 12 percent premium in Syria15. This
shows that, in Lebanon and Syria, it is unlikely that the formality premium can be
explained solely by workers’ ability and socioemotional characteristics.
Nonetheless, ability and some personality traits do somehow influence earnings
within the formal sector, albeit more in Lebanon than in Syria. When separate regres-
sions are run for formal and informal workers (see Table 5), cognitive score measures
have a significant effect on formal worker earnings in Lebanon. Formal workers with
cognitive scores in the fourth and fifth quintiles earn 20–25 percent more than those
who scored in the first quintile. On the other hand, the ability of informal workers in
Lebanon does not significantly influence their earnings. Similarly in Syria, cognitive
scores do not seem to influence the wage determination in the informal sector;
however, formal workers with cognitive scores in the fifth quintile earn 24 percent
more than formal workers who scored in the first quintile16.
5.3 Quality of jobs
When it comes to the quality of jobs, the evidence suggests that formal workers in
general have better-quality employment in terms of benefits and stability (see Table 6).
Formal workers in both Lebanon and Syria are more likely than informal workers to
have written contracts and are also more likely (in Lebanon) to be able to choose when
to work overtime and to get paid for it17 in addition to having overall higher earnings.
Around 64 percent and 77 percent of formal workers in Lebanon and Syria, respectively,
Table 4 Regressions for estimating the formality premium
Lebanon Syria
Dependent variable: log hourly wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal 0.2340*** 0.2159*** 0.123*** 0.119***
(0.0492) (0.0523) (0.0443) (0.0448)
Female −0.0966** −0.0872** −0.137*** −0.122***
(0.0442) (0.0440) (0.0453) (0.0442)
Years of education 0.0203*** 0.0169*** 0.0418*** 0.0334***
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.00429) (0.00424)
Age 0.0135 0.0121 0.0460*** 0.0465***
(0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0126) (0.0121)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.000468*** −0.000470***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.000168) (0.000159)
Firm size <5 (base 10–49) −0.1615** −0.1591** 0.0489 0.000480
(0.0657) (0.0671) (0.0865) (0.0864)
Firm size 5-9 −0.0123 −0.0398 −0.0747 −0.0460
(0.0617) (0.0670) (0.0840) (0.0843)
Firm size >50 0.0092 −0.0201 −0.0740 −0.0683
(0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0688) (0.0667)
Cognitive score quintile 2 0.0409 −0.00731
(0.0605) (0.0520)
Cognitive score quintile 3 0.1341** 0.0397
(0.0666) (0.0553)
Cognitive score quintile 4 0.1897*** 0.0903
(0.0675) (0.0651)
Cognitive score quintile 5 0.1424** 0.229***
(0.0713) (0.0760)








Emotionally stable 0.0725* −0.0361
(0.0418) (0.0390)
Constant 1.3230*** 1.2106*** 3.082***
(0.2542) (0.2642) (0.243)
Observations 503 491 928
R-squared 0.3817 0.4351 0.300
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Regression (2) for Lebanon and (4) for
Syria control for industry and region dummies.
Alloush et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 10 of 182013, 2:18
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/18have written contracts with their firms; those percentages significantly shrink, to 18.4
percent and 26.7 percent, for informal workers. These differences hold even when we
control for educational level, gender, age, and firm size. We also add cognitive and
Table 5 Separate regressions for formal and informal employees
Lebanon Syria
Dependent variable: log hourly wage Formal Informal Formal Informal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.0263 −0.1113 −0.116* −0.165***
(0.0537) (0.0680) (0.0622) (0.0599)
Years of education 0.0162*** 0.0216*** 0.0272*** 0.0427***
(0.0059) (0.0080) (0.00566) (0.00629)
Age 0.0398*** −0.0273 0.0346** 0.0599***
(0.0151) (0.0244) (0.0158) (0.0175)
Age2 −0.0004** 0.0004 −0.000276 −0.000714***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.000203) (0.000237)
Firm size <5 (base 10–49) 0.0005 −0.1273 0.151 −0.0102
(0.1171) (0.0831) (0.170) (0.0791)
Firm size 5-9 −0.1128 0.0630 −0.0487 −0.0205
(0.0966) (0.1181) (0.144) (0.0869)
Firm size >50 −0.0687 0.0620 −0.0375 −0.0733
(0.0547) (0.1235) (0.0775) (0.0847)
Cognitive score quintile 2 0.0555 −0.0350 −0.00565 −0.0397
(0.0777) (0.0976) (0.0706) (0.0760)
Cognitive score quintile 3 0.1395* 0.1285 −0.0175 0.0925
(0.0756) (0.1057) (0.0726) (0.0680)
Cognitive score quintile 4 0.2555*** 0.1268 0.103 0.0551
(0.0784) (0.1080) (0.0873) (0.0885)
Cognitive score quintile 5 0.1987** 0.0592 0.244** 0.124
(0.0861) (0.1175) (0.109) (0.108)
Open to experience 0.0116 0.0600 0.0958** 0.0804
(0.0534) (0.0634) (0.0365) (0.0525)
Conscientious 0.0776 −0.1202* −0.0461 0.000522
(0.0555) (0.0673) (0.0590) (0.0731)
Extrovert 0.0383 0.1228 −0.0464 −0.0442
(0.0541) (0.0769) (0.0478) (0.0581)
Agreeable −0.1317** −0.1040 −0.207*** −0.127**
(0.0542) (0.0689) (0.0491) (0.0557)
Emotionally stable 0.0475 0.0633 −0.0596 0.0127
(0.0543) (0.0742) (0.0450) (0.0803)
Constant 0.9856*** 1.8049*** 3.439*** 2.873***
(0.2984) (0.4399) (0.340) (0.314)
Observations 290 201 552 376
R-squared 0.3837 0.3755 0.281 0.322
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All the regressions above control for
industry and region.
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Informal employees are also less likely to receive job training. As such, informal workers
may not be gaining the skills that can increase their productivity, a deficit that in itself can
perpetuate informality.
Table 6 Differences in reported job characteristics between formal and informal jobs for
Lebanon and Syria
Lebanon Syria
Formal Informal Difference Conditional
differencea
Formal Informal Difference Conditional
differencea







n.a 67.80% n.a n.a. n.a. 65.6% n.a. n,a.
Looking for
jobs
7.8% 19.3% 11.50% 13.1%*** 20.6% 22.7% 2.1% 3.4%
Written
contract
64.1% 18.4% −45.70% −32.5%*** 76.7% 26.7% −50.1% −40.8%***
Can ask for
overtime
38.4% 27.2% −11.20% −8.2% * n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Can refuse
overtime
47.4% 33.4% −14.00% −7.5%* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Paid for
overtime
49.3% 36.9% −12.40% −8.7%** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Access to job
training
58.5% 29.0% −29.50% −21.7%*** 23.3% 14.2% −9.2% −7.5%**
Benefits
Annual leave 85.70% 37.30% −48.40% −36.9% *** 92.96% 68.2% −24.76% −26.4%***
Official leave 92.30% 68.30% −24.00% −20.9% *** 96.36% 90.85% −5.51% −6.27%***
Emergency
leave
50.70% 36.30% −14.40% −11.7% *** 54.54% 55.72% 1.18% 5.04%
Maternity leave 61.20% 25.70% −35.50% −23.2% *** 4.69% 1.26% −3.42% −5.97%*
Sick leave 87.00% 61.40% −25.60% −20.5% *** 67.63% 58.18% −9.45% −11.8%***
Transport
allowance
73.80% 26.40% −47.40% −36.6% 78.47% 55.4% −23.07% −7.5%
Family
allowance
62.80% 9.87% −52.93% −47.3% 18.61% 2.2% −16.39% −4.41%***
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
aConditional differences present means conditional on age, age squared, gender, years of education, and firm size.
Alloush et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 12 of 182013, 2:18
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/18Interestingly, the difference between formal and informal workers in average hours
worked per week is small and not statistically significant in Lebanon18. This is not the
case for Syria, where informal workers worked an average of 2.1 hours more per week
than formal workers and this difference is statistically significant. Moreover, when
access to annual or other types of leave is accounted for, informal workers end up
working significantly more per year than formal workers in both countries.
Table 6 also looks at the differences between formal and informal workers in terms of
access to benefits. For instance, in Lebanon, 85 percent of formal workers benefit from
annual leave, whereas only 37 percent of informal workers receive annual leave. In
general, informal workers in Lebanon and Syria are significantly less likely to have
access to benefits such as family, sick, or maternity leaves. Furthermore, in Lebanon,
only 26 percent of informal workers receive any transport allowance, while over 70
percent of formal employees get such an allowance. These discrepancies between
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education, gender, age, and firm size.
Moreover, in Lebanon, informal workers are more likely than formal workers to want
to change jobs or to be searching for new employment, even when age, education, and
other characteristics are taken into account. We thus explore this difference in detail
by including a richer set of controls (e.g., industry, region, and cognitive and socioemo-
tional ability) in probit regressions (see Table 7). Even controlling for this rich set of
controls, informal employees are 21 percentage points more likely than formal ones to
want to change jobs. This suggests that informal employees are more likely to be
dissatisfied with their jobs and stuck in employment that they find less than optimal. In
Syria, where workers were asked directly about how satisfied they were with their jobs,
informal workers are less likely than formal ones to be satisfied when age, education,
and other characteristics are taken into account. However, although the coefficient is
positive, it is not significant (see Table 7)19,20.
The evidence on the quality of jobs in the formal and informal sectors suggests the
existence of segmentation in the labor market, especially in Lebanon. In the Middle
East and North Africa, informal work is generally associated with worse job conditions,
and the wage gaps between formal and informal workers indicate that informal workers
do not seem to be compensated for these differences in job conditions. Indeed, the
wage analysis in the section above suggests that informal workers have lower wages
than formal workers with similar personal characteristics. In Lebanon, we find evidence
that informal workers are significantly more likely to want to change jobs. However, in
economies such as those in the Middle East and North Africa, where high-quality job
growth is low (Gatti et al. 2012), lower pay and worse conditions in the informal sector
might be seen by workers as a last-resort option, especially for workers who cannot
wait until a formal or public job becomes available.
5.4 Self-employment in Lebanon
There is evidence in the literature that informality for the self-employed is often a
choice, whereas informal wage employment is not (Maloney 2004; Arias and Khamis
2009). We investigate this hypothesis in Lebanon. The evidence in this paper—showing
a significant wage gap between informal and formal employees as well as significant
job-quality differences between formal work and informal wage work—indicates that
informal wage work is likely not a choice. On the other hand, there is a statistically
significant (26 percent) wage premium between self-employment and informal employ-
ment when the relevant controls are in the equation (see Table 8). This evidence
suggests that self-employment, while informal, is more likely to be an individual’s
choice when compared with formal employment. Even though the self-employed lack
the benefits of social insurance, this lack might be implicitly offset by their desire for
autonomy (Arias and Khamis 2009).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper examines earnings differentials between formal and informal jobs and the
presence of other labor market divides between formal and informal labor markets in
Lebanon and Syria. It uses data from matched employer-employee surveys collected in
Lebanon and Syria. The analysis controls for cognitive and socioemotional ability when
Table 7 Probit regression for wanting to change jobs (Lebanon) and job satisfaction
(Syria) (marginal effects reported)
Dependent variable: Lebanon – want to change jobs Syria – job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal −0.2140*** −0.2099*** 0.0173 0.0116
(0.0535) (0.0559) (0.0295) (0.0281)
Female −0.0086 −0.0034 0.0476* 0.0534**
(0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0280) (0.0271)
Years of education 0.0016 0.0010 0.00245 0.00213
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.00223) (0.00243)
Age 0.0258* 0.0276* −0.00190 −0.00124
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.00840) (0.00878)
Age2 −0.0004** −0.0004** 7.10e-05 6.79e-05
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.000116) (0.000123)
Firm size <5 (base 10–49) −0.0368 −0.0511 −0.00745 −0.00563
(0.0665) (0.0688) (0.0479) (0.0501)
Firm size 5-9 −0.0067 −0.0151 0.0551 0.0605*
(0.0778) (0.0783) (0.0340) (0.0314)
Firm size >50 0.0751 0.0505 −0.0130 −0.0173
(0.0574) (0.0587) (0.0367) (0.0373)
Cognitive score quintile 2 −0.0412 0.0117
(0.0666) (0.0370)
Cognitive score quintile 3 0.0606 0.00304
(0.0735) (0.0306)
Cognitive score quintile 4 0.0993 −0.0285
(0.0812) (0.0415)
Cognitive score quintile 5 0.1219 0.0417
(0.0797) (0.0409)












Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All the regressions above control for
industry and region.
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with a rich set of controls for workers and firms’ characteristics, the formality premium
persists at 22 percent and 12 percent in Lebanon and Syria, respectively.
Table 8 Wage premium regressions for Lebanon self-employed vs. informal employees











Cognitive score quintile 2 0.0667
(0.0546)
Cognitive score quintile 3 0.1227**
(0.0583)
Cognitive score quintile 4 0.1444**
(0.0635)
Cognitive score quintile 5 0.1046
(0.0663)














Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Regression (2) includes industry and
region dummies.
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work overtime, being paid for overtime work, and receiving job training—point to
worse working conditions among informal jobs. At the same time, informal employees
are significantly less likely to have job benefits. These findings indicate that the wage
gap, or informality penalty, is not offset by better working conditions or more generous
benefits. Overall, they suggest that informality among waged employees is not the result
of individual choice but is more likely due to exclusion from the formal sector—
particularly in Lebanon, where the evidence indicates that informal workers are signifi-
cantly more likely to want to change jobs.
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in removing existing barriers to the creation of high-quality, formal jobs. Evidence from
Brazil (Bruhn and McKenzie 2013) and Mexico (Bruhn 2011) shows that introducing
business-friendly reforms (e.g., simplified tax systems and one-stop shops for business
registration) or more frequent tax and labor inspections can produce small improve-
ments. Regarding the Middle East and North Africa, Gatti et al. (2012) argue that a
broad reform agenda will be needed to foster sustainable, high-value-added job growth
and reduce informality. Such an agenda will include fostering competition, moving
toward labor regulations that promote labor mobility and support during transitions,
realigning incentives in the public sector, reforming existing social insurance systems,
and improving workers’ productivity by building better skills.
Endnotes
1The Schneider Shadow Economy Index estimates the share of overall GDP that is
not declared to tax and regulatory authorities. It combines the multiple-indicator,
multiple-cause method, the physical input method, and the excess currency-demand
approach to estimate informality’s share of GDP (Schneider 2004).
2See Maloney (1999) and Bosch and Maloney (2010) for evidence for Mexico and
Brazil, and Perry et al. (2007) for an extensive discussion focused on countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
3The NSSF in Lebanon provides employees with health insurance coverage, end of
service pension, family allowances, and insurance for work-related accidents.
4Self-employed individuals are not registered in NSSF and are also considered
informal.
5Data from the 2009 Syrian Labor Force Survey.
6Data from the General Establishment for Social Insurance of Syria for 2009.
7Public sector employees were excluded from the survey.
8For a summary of Enterprise Survey data for Syria, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
Data/ExploreEconomies/2009/syria.
9The analysis was also conducted using the average rankings (1 through 7), yet this
did not improve the predictive power of the model and further complicated the
interpretation of the results.
10Results for Syria using a linear probability model or FE logit are qualitatively similar
and available from the authors upon request.
11The industries here are grouped into agriculture, manufacturing, and services.
12The only exceptions in Syria are individuals above 54 years of age or located in
Hama.
13Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions for Lebanon and Syria are
available upon request.
14Results in Syria using a model with firm fixed effects are qualitatively similar and
available from the authors upon request.
15Results are similar when firm fixed effects are taken into account.
16The separate regressions also indicate gender-related wage discrimination in both
sectors in Syria. Further, the regressions for Lebanon show that age is an important
factor in determining wages in the formal sector but not the informal one.
17The data with respect to overtime are available only for Lebanon.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/1818In Lebanon, informal employees work, on average, 48.4 hours (or 5.78 days) per
week compared with 46.96 hours (or 5.66 days) per week for formal employees. In
Syria, informal employees work an average of 50.8 hours and 5.96 days compared with
48.73 hours and 5.83 days for formal employees. A t-test reported a p-value of 0.16 in
Lebanon and of 0.0036 in Syria.
19One explanation for this is the role that public sector employment plays in the
Syrian labor market. Public employment is considered desirable, and the overall job
satisfaction of both formal and informal private employees may be tied to the attract-
iveness of public sector employment. In Syria, according to the General Organization
for Social Insurance, 69 percent of formal sector jobs are in the public sector, which is
not the case in Lebanon.
20Information on overall job satisfaction was not collected in Lebanon.
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